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Dealing with Terminally Ill Patients: An 
Institutional Approach 
Larry I. Palmer 
Decisions about the care of hopelessly ill and dying patients 
are never easy. At one time these decisions were private 
matters; health care providers and the patient or his family 
made decisions free from explicit scrutiny by others. With-
out much public knowledge the people directly affected 
undertook to resolve the ethical and medical issues presented 
by hopelessly ill and dying patients. 
With the increased success of modern medicine in 
helping people who have experienced a total cessation of 
cognitive functions stay alive, public interest about the 
decisions involved in such activities has increased. One 
result of heightened public concern is that courts have begun 
to play a role in monitoring the fate of irremediably ill or 
dying patients. Judicial involvement has not produced or 
revealed any societal consensus for dealing with these 
patients. In fact, recent decisions involving terminally ill 
patients have diverged in approach and outcome. No new 
legal doctrine concerning when a patient has a "right to die" 
emerges from these opinions. Furthermore, since decisions 
implicating this right have become matters of public con-
cern, the lack of social consensus about the methods and 
desirability of preserving human life has been apparent. 
In trying to answer the various issues put before them, 
courts have looked to the doctor-patient relationship as a 
framework for analysis. Under this approach the courts have 
focused on structuring the decision making of the physician 
and the patient or his representative. By emphasizing the 
doctor-patient relationship, the courts have argued that 
their analysis preserves "medical ethics." The various proce-
dures devised by courts are thus vehicles for preserving the 
value of life and diffusing responsibility for any decision. 
I propose that the legal system should not focus exclu-
sively on the doctor-patient relationship but instead become 
more sensitive to the institutional arrangement in which 
those doctor-patient relationships develop. Specifically, 
courts should rely on the hospital to devise procedures for 
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Saint Clare's Hospital, scene of one of the first ''right-to-
withhold-treatment'' cases 
considering issues involving terminally ill patients. As part 
of my approach, the courts should be more explicit about the 
relationship between legal rules and medical science. By 
focusing on hospitals as institutions, the relationship be-
tween law and medicine could develop based on substantive 
interaction rather than frozen archaic standards. 
There are benefits to both law and medicine from the 
adoption of an approach focused on the institutional settings 
of most of these cases. First, the legal analyses and solutions 
of the problems presented by these cases would be more 
disease-specific; rather than focusing solely on the "rights" of 
patients or physicians, the law would create a mechanism 
that recognizes the complexity and uncertainty of medical 
diagnosis and prognosis. Second, my approach would aid in 
the resolution of ethical issues present in these cases by 
frankly recognizing the role of other social institutions in 
deciding whether treatment should be provided or withheld. 
Third, I hope the proposed approach would lead legislatures 
to develop legal standards on some of the other major issues. 
Current Judicial Doctrines 
The highest state courts in New Jersey, Massachusetts, and 
New York have developed three different approaches to 
cases involving hopelessly ill or dying patients. 1 As the first 
step in demonstrating that these judicial opinions should be 
viewed as involving the demarcation of roles rather than as 
cases about rights (as claimed by all three courts), the three 
doctrines will be briefly described and criticized. 
New Jersey. Despite being heralded as the first impor-
tant right-to-die case, In re Quinlan 2 may be idiosyncratic. 
In Quinlan the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the 
guardian of a twenty-two-year-old woman, her father, was 
authorized to decide who should be Karen Ann Quinlan's 
attending physicians. The court further held that if those 
physicians and Quinlan's guardian concluded that there was 
no possibility of Quinlan recovering, they should jointly 
consult with a hospital body-called an ethics 
committee3-about any decision to discontinue treatment. 
If that committee agreed with the judgment of the guardian 
and treating physicians that recovery was not possible, the 
life-support treatment could be discontinued without liabil-
ity on the part of any participant. 
The Quinlan court had to assess issues of medical 
diagnosis and prognosis and devise a procedure for action to 
be taken. Karen Ann Quinlan was in a "persistent vegetative 
coma" with irreversible brain damage. Her breathing was 
assisted by a respirator. There was no clear explanation of 
why she had lapsed into a coma. The limited number of 
similar cases of young people in a persistent vegetative state 
made prognosis difficult in her case. Karen Ann Quinlan 
remains "alive" at the time of this writing, despite earlier 
predictions of her likely death. Even though Karen Ann 
Quinlan's condition was medically sui generis, the court, as 
it derived its set of legal procedures, was fully informed of the 
state of her medical condition. 4 
The New Jersey doctrine was founded on the notion 
that an adult patient has a constitutional right to privacy 
that allows the patient or a representative to cease or curtail 
treatment. The New Jersey court also implied that in some 
circumstances it would not be necessary to come before a 
court seeking declaratory relief but suggested that the use of 
ethics committees by the hospitals would be an acceptable 
means of approving the termination of treatment. Reliance 
on ethics committees would provide immunity from both 
civil and criminal liability. 5 
Massachusetts. After Quinlan, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts was presented with the case of 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz. 6 Saikewicz was a 
sixty-seven-year-old man with myeloblastic monocytic 
leukemia. He was also severely mentally retarded, having an 
IQ of ten and a mental age of about three years. Saikewicz 
had been institutionalized for fifty-three years. The prog-
nosis for his leukemia was discussed extensively. 
Chemotherapy was recommended because 30 to 50 percent 
of the patients with that form of leukemia are treated by 
chemotherapy. While prognoses are difficult in cases of 
leukemia, doctors estimated that if left untreated, a patient 
in Saikewicz's condition and of his age would live for a matter 
of weeks or perhaps months. 
When presented with a request by the parties to 
discontinue treatment, the court directed that a guardian be 
appointed and that a lower court review any decision, even if 
consented to by the guardian, to discontinue treatment of 
Saikewicz. The Massachusetts court agreed with the Quinlan 
court that the origin of the patient's right was Saikewicz's 
constitutional right of privacy. The appointment of the 
guardian was necessary because Saikewicz was legally incom-
petent and therefore had to have a representative. In this 
respect his severe mental retardation was an important 
aspect of the court's holding. The guardian was in effect 
being asked to seek judicial authorization to exercise 
Saikewicz's right of privacy and decline treatment. 7 
Saikewicz does not accurately reflect current Mas-
sachusetts doctrine. The court first announced that under 
some circumstances prior judicial approval was not required 
before termination of treatment for an incompetent pa-
tient. 8 Then the Massachusetts court made it clear that the 
constitutional right to decline treatment was not absolute, 
since the court has ordered treatment for a competent adult 
prisoner. 9 In its latest pronouncement, however, the Mas-
sachusetts court has reaffirmed the primary decisional role of 
courts in these life-and-death cases by requiring prior judicial 
approval before discontinuing treatment of an incompetent 
patient. 10 
The Massachusetts doctrine, in contrast to the New 
Jersey doctrine, emphasizes judicial review. The New Jersey 
doctrine saw the necessity of collective decision making by 
hospital committees, attending physicians, and the patient's 
representatives. Even though both doctrines are based on 
notions of the patient's consitutional right to refuse treat-
ment, one court sees the judiciary and another sees collec-
tive institutions as the interpreter of those rights. 
New York. In a recent opinion, Matter of Storar, 11 
involving two cases, the New York Court of Appeals 
announced its position on how courts should respond to 
hopelessly ill or dying patients. In the first of these cases, 
involving Brother Fox, the court indicated that when there 
is "clear and convincing proof' that a patient in a persistent 
vegetative state previously indicated that he or she did not 
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want life-supporting treatment, a guardian is authorized to 
discontinue treatment. Under the court of appeals' view, the 
guardian is not obligated to seek prior judicial approval of the 
decision to withhold treatment. The court further held that 
the authority to refuse treatment is grounded in common-law 
notions, rather than in a constitutional right, as the lower 
courts had assumed. 12 
In a second case involving a different medical situation, 
the legal analysis developed in Brother Fox's case was 
applied. The patient, John M. Storar, was a fifty-two-year-
old male who suffered from terminal bladder cancer. Lesions 
in his bladder had led to internal bleeding. His physicians 
ordered blood transfusions to sustain his life. The patient was 
severely mentally retarded and had been institutionalized. 
The patient's mother and guardian refused permission for the 
transfusions, and the director of Storar's state residence 
sought an order permitting the blood transfusions. The court 
of appeals held that the judicial order for a blood transfusion 
was appropriate, since the incompetent adult was like an 
infant in the sense that he could not have expressed his 
desires about life-sustaining treatment. 13 
Comparison. There are significant differences in 
analysis among the foregoing decisions. First, the source of 
the "right to withhold treatment" exists as a matter of 
constitutional law in Quinlan and Saikewicz and of common 
law in Storar. The obvious implication of the difference is 
that the New York court's analysis in Storar leaves theoreti-
cally greater latitude for legislative action. The New York 
court explicitly invited legislative solutions. 14 
Second, there is a difference in the judicial assessment 
of which institution, if any, should ratify the decision to 
withhold or curtail treatment. The New Jersey court placed 
its faith in collective decision making-the guardian, the 
hospital committee, the attending physician-outside the 
court. The Massachusetts court insisted on judicial approval 
of the decision to withhold treatment, except in some very 
limited circumstances. The New York court indicated that 
prior judicial approval was not required if there was clear 
evidence of the patient's intentions in this type of situa-
tion.15 
Third, since the various courts rely on different pro-
cedural devices in making decisions that come before them, 
patients, relatives of patients, physicians, and hospitals are 
encouraged to act in certain ways. Quinlan encourages 
hospitals to establish prognosis committees to monitor 
cessations of treatment. Saikewicz encourages parties to bring 
most cases to courts for involvement in the decision to 
withhold or discontinue treatment. Storar, by making the 
"clear and convincing proof" determinative of the patient's 
intentions, encourages the practice of writing "living wills," 
14 
where a prospective patient's attitudes toward life-sustaining 
treatment can be expressed. 16 
If the New York court's analysis were viewed as the high 
point of development of an analysis for a new area of the law, 
one might be reasonably satisfied with the two main features 
of the doctrine: 
1. A common-law right exists for persons, including incom-
petents, to choose to have life-sustaining treatment 
withheld. 
2. The right can be exercised without prior judicial supervi-
sion provided there is "clear and convincing evidence" of 
the patient's intentions. 
The New York doctrine might be viewed as sufficiently 
attractive to justify its being adopted by other courts. But the 
court of appeals is naive in its treatment of the degree of 
medical uncertainty in most cases. As a result, while the 
doctrine appears to be legally tidy, the court has not 
established for the many cases standards of conduct that can 
be applied easily. 
An Institutional Solution: Legal Standards for Care 
of Terminally Ill Patients 
The courts' failure to evaluate the role of medical science in 
their opinions has several important consequences. First, the 
courts seem to recast the medical facts to fit their proposed 
doctrines, ignoring medical and scientific uncertainty in 
developing their legal analyses. Second, the role of compet-
ing institutions, such as families, state facilities for the 
developmentally disabled, hospitals, and so on, is not openly 
acknowledged in the judicial opinions. 
In my view, since the decisions about terminally ill 
patients are made within the institutional context of the 
hospital, the hospital should establish a decision-making 
process for the participants in the decision to discontinue or 
withhold treatment. I suggest that hospitals should establish 
medical prognosis committees to deal with patients. After 
consulting with family, nurses, and others, the attending 
physician should be required to bring before the committee 
his or her request to terminate or curtail treatment to 
patients in acute vegetative states, to patients suffering 
certain degenerative brain diseases, or to patients who have 
experienced "brain death." The committee would have the 
responsibility to accept or reject the doctor's prognosis. 
The primary purpose of this committee is to objectify 
that which can be objectified, the medical prognosis. The 
other purpose is to provide assurance to the hospital as an 
institution that the various individuals within it are exercis-
ing their professional responsibilities vis-a-vis patients. This 
committee is not an ethics committee that could legitimate a 
decision to terminate treatment. 
The consultation process is to ensure that the doctor-
patient relationship is maintained as the fundamental basis 
for ethical decisions. If the doctor is not willing to take 
personal responsibility for the decision, he or she should not 
propose to the patient or the patient's representative that a 
certain action be taken. Ethics are a matter for all people in 
the society, not simply the doctors involved. 
If such committees were effective, perhaps legislatures 
would be encouraged to enact legislation that would require 
hospitals to have an additional committee to legitimate the 
discontinuation of treatment. A bill might read something 
like the following: "When death is a likely consequence for 
an adult patient, no order to withhold or terminate treat-
ment should be undertaken by a physician unless an appro-
priate hospital committee has reviewed and approved the 
decision to withhold or terminate treatment." This broader 
committee legislation would legitimate the proposed com-
mittees and create other committees to deal with aspects of 
such cases other than medical prognosis. For instance, the 
real problem in the case ofJohn Storar is that there is no one 
to exercise the decision that the New York Court of Appeals 
says is his to make. An appropriate committee for the Storar 
case is a committee composed of employees of the state 
residence where he lives, social workers, clergy, and 
laypeople. Furthermore, a committee in Storar's case must 
be able to support the physician's ethical decision as it 
contends with the conflicting views of the guardian and the 
state official. This second kind of committee would not 
replace the refusal of a guardian or a competent individual or 
an attending physician to curtail treatment. 
These court cases present us with an opportunity to 
think about structuring the legal system in such a way that 
hospitals and other institutions could become more visible 
and be given more credence. We could thus rely on the 
health care institutions to help exercise control over the 
professionals who are operating within these institutions. In 
addition, we could allow medicine to play its appropriate role 
in the society and allow law to play its role of providing order 
in situations of deep conflict. 
I am not offering a legal definition of death or the end of 
all litigation concerning termination of treatment. Rather, 
my approach to this issue allows law to leave some questions 
unresolved, perhaps to be resolved by others outside the 
institution of law. 
The suggested approach reflects a belief that the lack of 
social consensus about the care of hopelessly ill and dying 
patients is a function of modern medicine itself. The 
approach therefore encourages courts to define the role of 
law in relation to the realities of modern medicine and to 
avoid existing analyses of "consent" that provide little 
practical guidance for health care providers or for their legal 
consultants. The risk of the current approach of focusing on 
the doctor-patient relationship is that law will be ignored, 
either because it fails to take account of the value system of 
modern medicine or because it inhibits the proper function-
ing of medicine-a major institution of the society. 
Professor Palmer teaches criminal 
law, criminal procedure, children 
and the law, and law and medicine. 
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1. Although I will focus only on New Jersey, Massachusetts, and 
New York, the judiciaries of other states have also dealt with issues 
surrounding the terminally ill [e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 3 79 So. 2d 
359 (Fla. 1980)]. 
2. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A. 2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. 
Garger v. N.J., 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
3. Despite the court's label of "ethics committee," the commit-
tee was to function as a medical prognosis committee rather than as 
a body to decide ethics. 
4. Supra note 2, at 51, 355 A. 2d at 669. 
5. Id. at 55, 355 A. 2d at 672. 
6. 373 Mass. 728, 370N.E. 2d417 (Mass. 1977). 
7. Id. at 759, 370 N.E. 2d at 424. 
8. In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N. E. 2d 134 
(Mass. App. 1978). 
9. Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, Mass. Adv. Sh. 
(1979) 2523, 399N.E. 2d452 (Mass. 1979). 
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10. Inre Spring, Mass. Adv. Sh. (1980) 1209,405 N.D. 2d 115 
(Mass. 1980). 
11. 52 N.Y. 2d363, 420N.E. 2d64 (N.Y. 1981). 
12. Id. at379, 420 N.E. 2d at 72. 
13. Id. at 382, 420 N.E. 2d at 73. 
14. Id. at382-83,420N.E. 2dat74. 
15. Id. 
16. TheStorar court implies that "living wills" might be used. 52 
N.Y. 2d376-77, 420N.E. 2d 70-71 (N.Y. 1981). Inre Living 
Will, 5 Nova L.]. 445 (1981) encourages the use of"living wills," 
or documents executed by people during their lifetime that express 
their wishes concerning medical treatment in contemplation of 
illness or death. A more complete analysis of this problem would 
require us to examine the institutional context in which living wills 
become operative. Imagine that one spouse has signed a living will 
and is now comatose; contrary to the desires expressed in a living 
will, the other spouse does not want treatment discontinued. In this 
situation, is it appropriate under an institutional approach for a 
doctor to discontinue treatment? 
